Analysis. Parliament. Faction.

The Party of Regions standing for snap presidential elections-2014: Will it avoid the curse of the "ruling party"?

Monday, 28 April 2014 1590
Author: Oles Lisnychuk
The activities of the Party of Regions for the last two months included the evasion of the responsibility, inert position, focus on the group interests, desire for revenge and broadcast of the Russian messages. All these will unavoidably bring the party to the bottom of impassable 5% barrier in snap parliamentary elections.

During its unchallenged domination the Party of Regions made the term "precursors" (famous “poperednyky”) an ideological concept. This was especially memorable when said by PR Prime Minister Mykola Azarov. Now, when the PR had lost the ruling position, the notion of precursors remains topical. The only difference is that now the PR members should look back at the rest of their predecessors - the "ruling parties" that have existed in Ukraine and the not-funny destinies after they lost influence.

Since independence, several political actors had been awarded the proud title of "ruling party". Among these NDP, Social Democrats (United) and Nasha Ukraina. Each of them had a difficult history. Each of them became the “ex-ruling party” eventually. Finally, in each case this was disastrous, and party quickly marginalized.

The Party of Regions was removed from power after the revolution. Despite that, unlike its predecessors, the party still possessed serious prospects to remain sufficiently influential in Ukrainian politics.

In February 2014 PR essentially lost influence at the level of executive management and leadership of parliament. However, the parliament faction was preserved. Moreover, despite significant outflows it remained (and still remains) the largest faction. The party retained a majority in the local government, which was its traditional area of influence. PR position in informal strata of Ukrainian politics became even stronger. Specifically, the impact on the judiciary had increased. The Party still concentrated enormous financial resources. The ways of integration in the post-revolutionary inter-elite agreements had mapped out. PR quickly managed to eliminate the topic of lustration.  

On the other hand, it did suffer from painful injuries. After Viktor Yanukovych and his immediate political environment’s escape the PR had became the personification of the previous regime and had to bear the full responsibility for the dictatorship and its bloody end.

Throughout its existence, the Party of Regions was implemented as a political actor, subject to the totality

Unlike the other "ruling parties" the Party of Regions had constantly been trying to impose hegemony. It did not opt for ideological and administrative resources. Instead, the party had made the stake for violence, including, literally, criminal pressure. Throughout its existence, the Party of Regions was implemented as a political actor, subject to the totality. The highest possible dominance became the sense of party’s cohesion, combat, and later the existence. This was first in one region and then throughout the country. Internal stratifications, debates, conflicts and discords were fully blocked, covered and concealed, creating the image of the party-monolith. Ideological backing played a supportve role, and within 4 years in office it has turned into quite decorative.

Since 2014 Viktor Yanukovych represented the unwavering integrity PR. The support of the President Yanukovych has actually become party’s ideology. Thus after the disappearance of Yanukovych his party got disoriented and disorganized.

This, however, wasn’t the main disaster for the Party of Regions. The hardest catastrophe for party members was the ban of the main financial flows. Previously the membership in the "ruling party" promised wide, often unlimited resources for the enrichment at the expense of the state budget.

PR tries to survive, asserting itself as a major force in "own territory"

In situation after Yanukovych’s flee and the loss of influence, the Party of Regions and its elites had several possible options. All scenarios would eventually lead to painful losses. However, under certain circumstances the rapid collapse of the Party of Regions would have been avoided. Yet the party leadership had chosen the course for the “political abyss”. The list of their requirements was not yet completed. Most importantly, it means that PR tries to survive, asserting itself as a major actor in "own territory." The limits of the “own territory” remain questioned. Both recent social research and the attitude of the party towards separatist rebellions in the East confirm this.

PR intentionally distanced from separatist conflict

The tactics of intentional distancing from unleashing separatist conflict in the Donetsk and Lugansk region was chosen. However, the effect differed from the expected. The separatist rebellion launched under the Russian influence and with the support of the former, rapidly covered both regional and nationwide political space.

Public speeches of Rinat Akhmetov and other PR members calling "to hear the Donbas say" fitted into the context of extremism, terrorism and foreign sabotage, which was very frustrating for the speakers.

On the other hand, such position diminished the traditional image of the Party of Regions as a strong party, the party of deeds, which "resolved the issues" and, finally, the party of the Donbas. Accordingly, the question arises: if the party does not control the situation “at home” (in the Donbas), can it speak on behalf of the "South-East"?

Party of Regions has stopped public parliamentary activity

Out of 204 faction members at the moment of "January 16th laws" adoption the faction retained more than half of its members. Yet it kept "losing weight". On April 18th 104 MPs remained. It is still the largest group of Ukrainian Parliament. But the decay processes continue. Moreover, the Party of Regions faction in Verkhovna Rada virtually stopped public parliamentary activity.

In the early days after the escape Yanukovych his colleagues in Parliament took an active part in discussions and voting. This allowed overcoming the vacuum of central government and making the legitimate change. Instead, PR MPs have become inert and passive since the beginning of the Russian aggression of against Ukraine. Formally, this coincided with the announcement of PR shift in the opposition.

In recent weeks the Parliament had been voting on issues of critical importance to the economy and security of the country. At the same time within PR faction there is a group of fifty or more MPs consistently checked in “Rada” voting system as “Absent”.  Maybe they were physically present in the session hall, in the lobby or elsewhere, yet they were not registered and did not participate in the work of Parliament. The faction demonstrates no motivated voting – balanced “for”, “against” and “withhold”. The position of registered members is reflected through the option "Do not vote." That is, the virus of "withdrawal" that helped the formal justification of Viktor Yanukovych overthrow since was firmly used by his party and former colleagues.

The results of the PR faction voting on the most pressing issues in the last month (since March 17 - the first Parliamentary working day after the "referendum" in the Crimea) are listed below: 

#

Date

Draft law #

Title

Voting by the MPs of the Party of Regions

«For»

«Against»

«Withhold»

«Do not vote»

«Absent»

1

17.032014

4466

Draft Law approving the Decree of the President of Ukraine "On the partial mobilization"

16

0

0

7

97

2

17.032014

2591

Law on Amending Certain Laws of Ukraine on service in the reserve

20

0

1

6

93

3

17.032014

4464

Law amending the Law of Ukraine "On State Budget of Ukraine for 2014"

7

0

0

15

98

4

20.032014

4498

Declaration on the fight for the liberation of Ukraine

29

0

0

4

87

5

20.032014

4475

Resolution on the Declaration of the Parliament of Ukraine for securing the rights of the Crimean Tatar people as part of the Ukrainian State

32

0

0

3

85

6

25.032014

4542

Resolution on the dismissal of Tenyukh I.Y. from the position of the Minister of Defense of Ukraine

8

0

1

54

57

7

25.032014

4543

Resolutions appointing M. Koval as Acting Minister of Defense of Ukraine

16

0

2

42

60

8

25.032014

2482

Law on Amendments to Some Laws of Ukraine regarding the inclusion of information on existing legal entities and natural persons - entrepreneurs in the Unified State Register

46

0

0

18

56

9

25.032014

2207

Law on Amending the Law of Ukraine "On Public Procurement" (to reinforce the transparency of procurement companies)

14

0

1

47

58

10

27.032014

4575

Law on Amending the Law of Ukraine "On State Budget of Ukraine for 2014"

0

16

2

36

67

11

27.032014

4576

Law on Prevention of financial disaster, and creating conditions for economic growth in Ukraine

1

14

3

16

86

12

27.032014

4500-1

Law on Amendments to Certain Laws of Ukraine to ensure the mobilization

18

0

0

8

94

13

27.032014

0947

Law on Amendments to Certain Laws of Ukraine in connection with the adoption of the Law of Ukraine "On Information" (as amended) and the Law of Ukraine "On Access to Public Information"

8

0

1

17

94

14

28.03 2014

4598

Resolution on the establishment of the Interim Commission of Inquiry to investigate the circumstances of the death of O. Muzychko

17

0

0

3

100

15

01.04.2014

4614

Resolution on the immediate disarmament of illegal armed forces in Ukraine

26

0

0

2

92

16

01.04.2014

4561

Law approving the decision of the President of Ukraine on admitting units of armed forces of other countries in territory of Ukraine in 2014 for participation in multinational exercises

3

0

1

13

103

17

08.04.2014

№4524-1

Law on Amendments to the Criminal Code of Ukraine (concerning liability for crimes against national security of Ukraine)

1

0

0

11

107

18

08.04.2014

2664

Law on Amending the Law of Ukraine "On the Election of Members of Parliament of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, local city and village councils, village, town and city mayors" (on technical and legal improvement of the electoral process)

2

0

0

4

113

19

08.04.2014

№4378-1

Law on Restoration of Confidence in the judicial system of Ukraine 

1

0

0

1

107

20

08.04.2014

4627

Decree amending the Decree of Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine "On creation of Temporary special commission of Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine to prepare the Draft Law on amendments to the Constitution of Ukraine"

1

0

0

1

107

21

08.04.2014

4491

Law on Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of Ukraine to strengthen the material and financial security of the state defense

1

0

0

1

107

22

09.04.2014

2436а

Law on Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of Ukraine to reduce the number of permit documents

42

0

0

2

64

23

10.04.2014

4587

Law on Public Procurement

0

0

2

40

66

24

10.04.2014

4646

Law on Amendments to the Customs Code of Ukraine (concerning the improvement of regulations)

41

0

0

10

57

25

15.04.2014

№2258а

Law on Amendments to Certain Laws of Ukraine to simplify the procedure for starting a business

6

0

1

41

57

26

15.04.2014

4473-1

Law on ensuring rights and freedoms of citizens in the temporarily occupied territory of Ukraine – in the second reading and in principle

1

0

0

27

77

27

16.04.2014

4696

Resolution on the Declaration of the Parliament of Ukraine "On the initiative of the international negotiations on de-escalation of the situation around Ukraine"

2

0

1

23

79

28

17.04.2014

4519

Decision on additional measures to strengthen the defense of Ukraine due to aggression of the Russian Federation

0

0

0

33

71

29

17.04.2014

2829

Law on Amending the Law of Ukraine "On the National Council of Ukraine on TV and Radio" (on the dissolution of the council members)

0

0

0

30

74

30

17.04.2014

0921

Law on restoration of rights of persons deported on ethnic grounds

0

0

0

6

98

31

17.04.2014

1076

Law on Public Television and Radio Broadcasting of Ukraine

0

0

0

34

70

The table above demonstrates that the Party of Regions never devoted the majority of votes to the decisions important for the country at the time of great danger.

The following draft laws received the maximum PR support:

1)    "Law on Amendments to Some Laws of Ukraine regarding the inclusion of information on existing legal entities and natural persons - entrepreneurs in the Unified State Register» (2482) - 46 votes;

2)    "Law on Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of Ukraine on reducing the number of permit documents» (2436a) - 42 votes;

3)    "Law on Amendments to the Customs Code of Ukraine (concerning the improvement of certain provisions)” (4646) - 41 votes.

These laws regulate economic relations. Voices for their support were given not as a reflection of the collective position of the faction, but because parliamentarians and their groups considered these meet their interests.

Party of Regions faction has significant problems with representation of collective interests, formation of a common position and defending the party brand

Remarkably, the issues of doing business caused greater activity than the issues of national security or stabilization of the socio-economic situation in the country. This indicates that the Party of Regions faction has significant problems with the representation of collective interests, the formation of a unified position and defending the party brand.

Refusal to vote on the most important issues was officially explained by the opposition status of the PR. However, this explanation was too weak and ineffective. In fact, this was an attempt to cover the low capacity of the fraction, first and foremost its incapability as a collective entity.

The opposition should clearly define its position while military actions are taking place. Is it supporting the nation or the enemy? Being an opposition under conditions of foreign aggression is different from being an opposition under normal conditions. The opposition of any country that is being openly undermined by the occupier carries a part of the responsibility for the lack of position to counter the aggressor. Moreover, the previous activities of this party had opened the possibility for such aggression.

Party of Regions faction has neither foreign policy agenda, nor geopolitical positioning

Since the announcement of Russian aggression against Ukraine the Party of Regions did not form a clear position on this issue. Moreover, a number of prominent members of the party had repeatedly broadcasted pro-Russian agenda for Ukraine.

Although PR does not officially support separatist rebels, until recently it did not show a critical attitude towards them. Instead, the diverse messages in the information space from different sources indicated that members of the party joined the shadow support of the terrorists, primarily organizational and financial.

Russia saw of the prospects for the Party of Regions as a regional subdivision of "managing and directing" Putin’s party "Yedinaya Rossiya". This was fully proved by the Crimean PR branch.

Party of Regions faction maneuvers on "federalization"

PR call for "federalization" looked inorganic, despite the name of the party and its public documents. Being the ruling party during the regime of Yanukovych, PR focused on hyper-centralized model of public administration, management of political, economic, social, cultural processes in the country. Attempts to praise the slogans of decentralization to high heaven looked like an effort to save the party dominance at least in part of the country.

However, after some maneuvering PR proclaimed its loyalty to the idea of "unitary country". April 16th extraordinary congress of all level representatives of Donetsk region adopted a resolution calling for amendments to the Constitution that would provide for Russian as the second state language and a new distribution of powers between the center and the regions. In particular, the call was made for the direct popular election of the heads of regional and district councils, the formation of the executive committees of regional and district councils, and the dissolution of regional and district administrations. [1]

These positions to some extent can be considered as a willingness of PR to compromise. Moreover, they fit into the discourse of decentralization initiated by the current central government. At the same time, these positions are associated more with tactical moves of PR management than a balanced approach, developed within the entire party organization. Evidently these are based on the possible opportunities of the Party of Regions, provided by the elections of the heads of local administrations. This in turn would help PR to maintain the position of its investors and possibly prepare for political revenge.

PR loses the exclusive representation of the interests of "South East"

PR can no longer claim the exclusive representation of the interests of "South East" region. Currently its electoral support in the southern parts of the country reached nearly 5%. This, together with the support of the "Solidarity" brand, is the second position in the region. “Batkivschyna” is leading here with twice higher rates - 10% [2].

According to a survey conducted from March 28 to April 2, 2014 by the "Rating" group and the Razumkov’s Centre Mykhailo Dobkin runs fourth in the south. 5.6% of the inhabitants of this region would vote for him (Petro Poroshenko would have 21.6%, Serhiy Tigipko and Yulia Tymoshenko - 7.8% each). PR candidate runs third in the east with 7.6% support. This is less than 15.6% of Poroshenko and 12.2% of Tihipko, but a little more than Tymoshenko’s 6 %.

The poll of the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, held on 8-16 of April, 2014, in 8 regions of the country that traditionally belong to the so-called "South East" [3] has shown 7.3% support for Dobkin throughout the region. Poroshenko and Tihipko would get 18.9% and 9.1% respectively. Statistics by regions demonstrated that the PR-supported candidate could win a majority only in the Luhansk region where Dobkin had a rating of 9.9%. However, this position is "within the error” with Tihipko, a politician withdrawn from PR a few weeks ago. Dobkin has the highest rating in Kharkiv, his home region, with only 13.9% of the votes. 5.7% more residents of Kharkiv still see Poroshenko in office (19.6%).

Another important trend demonstrated by the results of the mentioned survey is that the region of "South East", often referred to by the Party of Regions, in fact does not exist. Moods, interests and orientations of residents of 8 regions differ significantly. This time other political forces, and not PR, may wish to work with this electoral field. For example, "Solidarity" (so far mostly on paper), or the new party project by Tihipko.

Part of the society, which voted for PR, is frustrated. In general, according to recent polls approximately 10.5% are still willing to vote for PR and 13.6% of the country’s population would come to the polls. [4] These are far from traditional leading figures of the party for the last decade, but not yet its final failure.

Moreover, the political situation in general, and electoral in particular, is highly dynamic and provides for changes, including radical changes. About a third (30.9%) of Ukrainians gives negative or rather negative assessments of the first actions of the new government. There are no clear prospects for this protest segment to narrow, rather it has the potential for growth.

If PR is to continue its public behavior of the last two months (with the focus on group interests, desire for revenge, escape from responsibility, etc.), it will likely suffer losses. Ratings of March-April may become unattainable in May, and the prospect of not reaching the 5% barrier in the next parliamentary elections is quite realistic.

References:

[1] Резолюция чрезвычайного съезда депутатов всех уровней Донецкой области [Resolution of an extraordinary congress of representatives of all levels of the Donetsk region] / / [Electronic resource]. - Mode of access: http://partyofregions.ua/news/534eac69f620d2f70b00016f   

[2] Public Opinion Survey. Residents of Ukraine. March 14 – 26, 2014 / / [Electronic resource]. - Mode of access: http://iri.org/sites/default/files/2014%20April%205%20IRI%20Public%20Opinion%20Survey%20of%20Ukraine%2C%20March%2014-26%2C%202014.pdf. - p.79

[3] Мнения и взгляды жителейюго-востока Украины: апрель 2014 [The views of the inhabitants of the South-East of Ukraine: April 2014]/ / [Electronic resource]. - Mode of access: http://zn.ua/UKRAINE/mneniya-i-vzglyady-zhiteley-yugo-vostoka-ukrainy-aprel-2014-143598_.html

[4] Суспільно-політичні настрої населення: березень 2014 [Social and political attitudes of the population: March 2014] / / electronic resources. Access: http://ratinggroup.com.ua/products/politic/data/entry/14084/

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